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I. INTRODUCTION

Eskedar T.W. awoke early one morning in August 2007 to find
the Eritrean Army knocking on the door of her two-room stone
house.1 The army of Dictator Isayas Afewerki came to enlist
Eskedar's brother, Huriyyah.2 With his whereabouts unknown,
Eskedar cautiously suggested she could not help. 3 The troops gave her
an ultimatum: find her brother in two days or die.4 With no other
options, Eskedar fled with her niece to Libya where the two boarded a
forty-foot rubber boat bound for southern Europe. 5 Close to three
weeks into the voyage, the boat, filled with almost fifty immigrants,
6
ran out of gas and drifted aimlessly in the Mediterranean for days.
While awaiting rescue from passing ships, tensions on the boat rose as
food rations depleted, leading to several tragic events. 7 Eskedar was
raped while others watched aboard the small vessel; days later she
watched helplessly as her niece succumbed to the extreme conditions
on the raft. 8 When the Maltese Search and Rescue ("SAR") finally
9
plucked the immigrants from the sea, only around ten were still alive.
The trek across the sea was only the beginning. Eskedar spent the
1°
next six months in one of Malta's military-guarded detention centers
because Maltese immigration law prescribes mandatory detention for
illegal immigrants. 1 Because most immigrants flee on short notice,
they often arrive in Europe with no documentation. 12 Thus, the victims
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Online Interview with Eskedar T.W. (Oct. 21, 2009).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

11. See Q&A: Maltese Lawyer Stands up for Boatpeople, UNHCR NEWS
STORIES, Sept. 21, 2007, available at http://www.unhcr.org/46f3eaea4.html

[hereinafter Q&A] ("Most people are rescued at sea ....

Whether they are brought

in or they land here, they are taken to register with the immigration police ....

After

registration, they are transferred to a detention centre.").
12. Africans Search for Better Lives in Europe (PBS television broadcast May
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of Africa's ongoing struggle become criminals of consequence,
imprisoned merely for wanting to survive.
With immigrant arrivals into Europe reaching over two million
each year, European Union ("EU") Member States' populations are
transforming. 13 In some areas, healthy economic growth and
decreasing unemployment rates have mitigated concerns about the
impact immigrants are having on mainstream Europe. 14 Despite this,
many leaders and citizens alike view immigrants as a problem rather
15
than an opportunity.
The EU is in a unique position to affect the fundamental rights of
immigrants by revising its immigration policies. 16 Current EU policy
exacerbates the human rights problems arriving immigrants suffer by
requiring those seeking asylum to remain in the EU nations they arrive
in, thus overburdening the immigration systems of those Member
States. 17 In particular, the Dublin Regulation 18 and other strictly
bilateral agreements between EU nations and immigrant source
countries 19 pose the most severe threat to immigrant safety.2 0 The
solution to the immigrant human rights problem needs to entail a more
supranational approach involving a mandatory burden-sharing
11,
2006),
available
at
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/africa/janjune06/immigration_05-1 1.html [hereinafter Africans].
13. HuGo BRADY, EU MIGRATION POLICY: AN A-Z 4 (Centre for European
Reform 2008), availableat http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/briefing-813.pdf.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Press Release, European Data Prot. Supervisor, Revision of EURODAC
and Dublin Regulations: EDPS Welcomes Attention Devoted to Data Protection and
Other
Fundamental
Rights
(Feb.
18,
2009),
available
at
http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/shared/Documents/EDPS/Publicatio
ns/Annualreport/2004/AnnualReport_2004_EN.pdf.
17. BRADY, supra note 13, at 7.
18. See discussion infra Part II.A.
19. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
20. See generally Italy/Libya: Gaddafi Visit Celebrates Dirty Deal, HUM. RTS.
WATCH,

June 9, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/enlnews/2009/06/O9/italylibya-gaddafi-

visit-celebrates-dirty-deal [hereinafter Gaddafi]; see also David Herrera, Blame it on
Libya,
MALTA
TODAY,
Apr.
29,
2009,
available
at

http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/2009/04/29/t7.html ("Libya is not a signatory of the
1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees."). Libya only recognizes economic
immigrants; this means they can repatriate immigrants at will. Id. The massive
deportation of immigrants raises grave concerns regarding human rights abuses. Id.
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mechanism between all EU Member States. Only a coherent and
comprehensive approach to immigration will be effective for the EU.
This Comment details the widespread human rights abuses
seabome immigrants face to illustrate the effect a change to the
Dublin Regulation will have on immigration in Europe. Next, Part II
identifies the EU's current approach to immigration concerns and the
resulting inhumane consequences this approach produces. Then, Part
III of this Comment analyzes current immigration trends by studying
Malta's problem as a microcosm of the immigration crisis strangling
Member States along the EU's southern border.
Part IV describes the countries from which immigrants constantly
flee and the reasons for their journey across the sea. Without a
mandatory burden-sharing mechanism, the current immigration policy
exposes EU Member States along Europe's southern border to
massive numbers of immigrants arriving each year. 21 As a result,
bilateral agreements are formed on a national level with North African
countries. 22 These agreements offer minimal protection for immigrants
and impair harmonization amongst Member States regarding
immigration policies. 23 Finally, Part V offers ideas to modify existing
policies in an effort to combat human rights abuses, especially with
regard to the Mediterranean region.
II. THE CURRENT EU APPROACH

A. The Dublin Regulation
Because the EU's current immigration policy is both incoherent
and unenforceable, the entire region handles immigration concerns
inconsistently, resulting in little transparency and almost no
accountability. 24 The controlling legislation for immigration in the EU
25
is the Dublin Regulation.
21.
22.
23.
24.
common

See Matthew Vella, Home and Away, MALTA TODAY, June 8, 2008, at 3.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
See discussion infra Part IV.B.
BRADY, supra note 13, at 7. If policies across the EU were consistent "[a]
asylum system should mean that all EU member-states provide refugees

with the same essential services on arrival; assess their claims the same way; and use
the same rules to grant and withdraw refugee status." Id.
25. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol40/iss2/5

4

De Blouw: Drowning Policies: A Proposal to Modify the Dublin Agreement and

2010]

HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

339

The first Dublin agreement, commonly referred to as the "Dublin
Convention," was signed by EU Member States in 1990 and ratified in
1997.26 The initial convention outlined the criteria for determining the
extent to which a Member State was responsible for an asylum seeker
(potential refugee).27 Soon after the Dublin Convention's inception,
28
issues surfaced that were not explicitly addressed in the convention.
One such issue garnering much attention was the issue of preventing
asylum seekers from exercising a broad choice to live in any EU
Member State. 29 "Such movement was viewed negatively since all
Member States were considered to be safe, [asylum seekers] could
claim asylum in any of them and further movement across Europe
therefore indicated a clear choice based on motives other than seeking
protection."30 These concerns resurfaced in European Commission

embodied in a new agreement called the
publications and were
31
Regulation.'
"Dublin
Enacted in September 2003, the Dublin Regulation required a
Member State to "be responsible for processing the immigrant's
asylum application" when an asylum seeker "[had] irregularly crossed
the border into a Member State." 32 This regulation was enacted to
prevent asylum seekers from taking advantage of relaxed asylum laws
in one Member State in an effort to reach a different EU Member
State with better working conditions, a practice referred to as asylum
shopping. 33 Contrary to this concern, "recent studies into the
movement of asylum seekers actually reveal that family and cultural
relationships and, in some cases, the role of smugglers are more
significant in determining the final country of asylum." 34 As a result
26. Michael Collyer, The Dublin Regulation, Influences on Asylum
Destinations and the Exception of Algerians in the UK, 17 J. REFUGEE STUD. 375,

377 (2004).
27. Id. at 375.
28. Id. at 378.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
II
Regulation,
Dublin
EU
Legislation,
of
32. Summaries
http://europa.eu/ egislation-summaries/justice-freedom-security/free-movement-of
persons-asylum-immigration/133153en.htm (2009) [hereinafter Summaries].
33. BRADY, supra note 13, at 7.

34. Collyer, supra note 26, at 375.
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of the Dublin Regulation, Mediterranean Member States are required
to deal with a disproportionate number of asylum seekers compared to
35
other European states.
B. InadequateNational Policies and Mandatory Detention
A common immigration arrangement, which the Dublin
Regulation purports to provide, should require all Member States to
offer immigrants uniform services and refugee claim evaluation on
arrival. 36 The regulation's current procedure assumes that the "laws
and practices of the participating [s]tates are all based on the same
common standards." 37 The regulation also treats all Member States as
38
equals with respect to the resources available to deal with refugees.
In reality, immigration procedures among EU Member States differ
greatly, leading to human rights problems, especially in Member
39
States overflowing with refugee populations.
For the smaller countries located on the EU's southern border,
resources to deal with the immigration problem remain inadequate.4 °
Discord regarding the Dublin Regulation means decisions made by
Member States at the national level often go unchecked, especially
regarding asylum. 4 1 The Dublin Regulation states "detention of...
[refugees] should only be possible under very clearly defined
exceptional circumstances. 42 Importantly, Article 27 of the regulation
35.

See generally BRADY, supra note 13, at 19-20 ("The EU member-states

along Europe's Mediterranean coastline have all experienced mass migration to their
shores in recent years.").
36. Id. at 7.
37. Press Release, United Nations High Comm'r for Refugees, EU Urged to
Revise its Dublin II Regulation in Order to Protect the Rights of Refugees and
Asylum Seekers (Apr. 20, 2006). However, the press release acknowledges that
asylum policies and practices in the European Union vary across countries, "causing

asylum-seekers to receive different treatment across Europe." Id.
38. See Q&A, supra note 11 ("There is an unfortunate tendency in Europe to
push the issue of immigrants to the border states, which are the least equipped and
experienced in dealing with this problem.").

39. See BRADY, supra note 13, at 7; see also Q&A, supra note 11.
40. Q&A, supra note 11.
41. BRADY, supra note 13, at 7.
42. Opinion of the Meijers Comm., Standing Comm. of Experts on Int'l

Immigration, Refugee and Criminal Law, The Proposals to Amend the Dublin
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notes detention should be "possible only if there is a 'significant' risk
of... [the immigrant] 'absconding."'' 43 Because the "risk of
absconding" is not defined in the regulation, 44 some Member States
treat all asylum seekers who fall under the Dublin Regulation's
umbrella as posing a risk, thus swallowing up the rule of "exceptional
circumstances" usually required for detention.45
This problem is intensified in the Mediterranean region because
Member States such as Malta and Cyprus are usually at the receiving
end of the immigrant flow. 46 That is, these Member States are required
to take care of arriving asylum seekers as well as failed asylum
seekers who are trying to reenter Europe at various stages.47 This
situation results in acts of human rights abuses because the
Mediterranean Member States' detention 48centers lack the capacity to
cope with the high volume of immigrants.
The Commission of the European Communities addressed the
Dublin Regulation's "deficiencies" relating to "the lack of
harmonization" in the current asylum system when proposing
suggestions for a "Common European Asylum System." 49 Rather than
promote commonality, the current regulation pushes immigrants away
from the center of the EU to the periphery; consequently distributing
immigrants unevenly across Europe, hitting the Mediterranean
Member States especially hard. 50 This disproportionate distribution
leaves countless asylum seekers without the protection they
desperately need.
Regulation,at 5, COM (2009) 0902 (Mar. 18, 2009).
43. Id.
44. Id. The Dublin Regulation briefly stipulates the risk of absconding must be
based on objective criteria defined by law. Id.
45. Id.
46. Vella, supra note 21.
47. Id.
48. See discussion infra Part III.B.
49. See Commission of the European Communities, Proposalfora Regulation
of the European Parliament and of the Council, Establishing the Criteria and
Mechanisms for Determining the Member State Responsible for Examining an
Application for InternationalProtection Lodged in One of the Member States by a
Third-country National or a Stateless Person, at 2-5, COM (2008) 820 final (Mar.
12, 2008).
50. See BRADY, supra note 13, at 7.
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The critics' concerns regarding the Dublin Regulation solidified
after members of the European Parliament recently visited detention
centers in Malta. The members recognized the limited capacity the
centers in Malta possessed and suggested the EU make every possible
effort to assist Member States facing similar situations. 51 Further, the
members believed future changes to the Dublin Regulation should
incorporate a "fair mechanism for sharing responsibilities among the
Member States. 52 Parliament members also called for a community
immigration policy that would take into account the geographical
location and hosting capacity of border states when determining
responsibility for immigrants.53
C. Frontex
In recent years the EU's internal borders have been nearly
eliminated, leading to an increase in the control of its external
borders. 54 A European agency called Frontex is aiding the EU with
controlling its external borders. This entity was established to manage
55
"[o]perational [c]ooperation at the [e]xternal [b]orders" of the EU.
The border agency, in theory, operates as an "intelligence-based,
independent and depoliticized" entity. 56 However, because Member
States are still primarily responsible for controlling and surveying
their borders, 57 Frontex's capacity to act is overly dependent on
51. Resolution on the Situation with Refugee Camps in Malta, EUR. PARL.
Doc. P6_TA (0136) (2006) ("[V]isits by delegations from its Committee on Civil
Liberties ...in Malta[] have shown that asylum seekers are detained in conditions
that fall far below internationally recognized standards .... Particular concerns

include physical conditions, as well as inadequate or non-existent access to basic
services, such as medical care or social and legal assistance.").
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Wies Maria Maas, Fleeing to Europe: Europeanization and the Right to

Seek Refugee Status 39 (Inst. of Soc. Studies, Working Paper No. 454, 2008).
55. Council Regulation 2007/2004, Establishing a European Agency for the
Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member
States of the European Union, 2004 O.J. (L 349) 1 (EC), available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:200 4 :34 9 :0001:001 I:E
N:PDF [hereinafter Agency].
56. Maas, supra note 54, at 39.
57. Agency, supra note 55, at 4 ("Member States may continue cooperation at
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cooperation from other Member States.5 8 "In addition, there is a
59
severe lack of democratic control over the agency's activities,"
mainly because the European Parliament's power over the
organization is solely focused on allocating a budget. 60 Further adding
to the lack of oversight is the fact that the risk assessments Frontex
agents prepare, which 61form the basis for all joint operations, are kept
secret from the public.
Although the regulatory language establishing Frontex subjects
62
the agency to protection obligations under the Refugee Convention,
the agency's mission is defined strictly in security terms. 63 The
agency's role is to assist Member States in training national border
guards, to follow up on research relevant to the control and
surveillance of external borders, to assist Member States in situations
requiring increased technical and operational support to secure their
borders, and, to provide Member States with the proper support
regarding joint return operations. 64 Notably, absent from Frontex's
mission is the obligation to protect immigrants.
Importantly, Frontex's policies aim to prevent immigrants from
entering the EU rather than protect their rights. 65 Commentators
compare Frontex's efforts to "erecting a Berlin wall on water,
controlling [the EU's] border[s] while removed from public
scrutiny." 6 6 Unfortunately, the agency's preventative approach has not
an operational level with other Member States and/or third countries at external
borders, where such cooperation complements the action of the agency.").
58. Maas, supra note 54, at 40 (citing Sergio Carrera, The EU Border
Management Strategy: Frontex and the Challenges of IrregularImmigration in the
Canary Islands 9 (Ctr. for European Policy Studies, Working Document No. 261,
2007)).
59. Maas, supra note 54, at 40.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Lori A. Nessel, Externalized Borders and the Invisible Refugee, 40
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 625, 655 (2009).
63. See Agency, supra note 55, at 1.
64. Id. at 4.
65. See Nessel, supra note 62 ("FRONTEX defines itsmission in security
terms - 'to integrate national border security systems of Member States against all
kinds of threats that could happen at or through the external border of the Member
States.'").
66. Nessel, supra note 62, at 656.
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helped save immigrant lives. 67 In fact, data suggests that some
immigrants purposefully avoid Frontex patrols and use more
68
hazardous routes where Frontex is absent.
Another negative consequence of Frontex's presence in the region
is that human traffickers capitalize on Frontex's patrols by using less
expensive material when building the boats used to cross the
Mediterranean. 69 The cheaper material decreases the chance of the
boats returning, thereby reducing the traffickers' need to pay for fuel
for return trips. 70 Even Frontex Chief Ilka Laitenen has admitted
traffickers have benefitted from Frontex's presence in the
Mediterranean: "traffickers force migrants to sink the boats they are
sailing in, so that they will be rescued by Frontex vessels. 71
III. THE MALTESE DILEMMA
A. Boat People: The Immigrant Flood in Malta and the
Mediterranean
Notably, the majority of the 65,000 immigrants crossing the
Mediterranean into Europe every year hail from Sub-Saharan Africa.72
Additionally, organized crime groups from Libya transport thousands
of immigrants from their northern shores into Europe via central
Mediterranean routes.73 With Libyan officials unable and unwilling to
control the flow of immigrants entering and leaving their country,
Mediterranean EU Member States like Malta will continue to feel the

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 652.
Id.

71. Jim Brundsen, Frontex Chief Warns About Failure to Reduce Migration,
EUROPEANVOICE.COM,
Nov.
9,
2008,
available
at

http://www.europeanvoice.com/article/imported/frontex-chief-warns-about-failureto-reduce-migration/62224.aspx.

72. Alexander Betts, Towards A MediterraneanSolution? Implicationsfor the
Region of Origin, 18 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 652, 652 (2006).
73. Roderick Pace, European Parliament Election Briefing No. 27 the
European Parliament Election in Malta, EUR. PARTIES ELECTIONS AND
REFERENDUMS
NETWORK
1,
11
(June 6,
2009),
available at
http://www.sussex.ac.uk/sei/documents/no-27_epemep2009malta.pdf.
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pressure of seaborne immigrants.74
The Dublin Regulation and Frontex exacerbate the uncertainty for
Mediterranean Member States, like Malta, dealing with immigration
problems. Malta's increasing role in dealing with asylum seekers is in
large part due to the nation's geographical location.75 Sitting just 180
miles north of Africa and fifty-eight miles south of Sicily, the
archipelago, made up of three islands,76 has become the frontline for
immigration since it joined the EU in 2004. 77 The problem is
intensified because Malta is already one of the most urban and densely
populated countries in the world. 78 Given Malta's small land area of
79
122 square miles (about twice the size of the District of Columbia)
and the roughly 400,000 inhabitants who dwell on the island, 80
immigration poses a tremendous strain on an already resource-limited
country.

81

Since the 1990s, the number of immigrants coming into the EU
74. See id. ("Libya claims it does not have the means to supervise its long land
borders (4,348 km) to stop irregular immigrants from entering the country from subSaharan Africa, nor to control its extensive coastline (1,770 km) to stop them from
trying to reach Europe.").
75. News Release, National Statistics Office-Malta, World Refugee Day (June
19, 2006), available at http://www.nso.gov.mt/ (follow "world refugee day 2006";
then follow "World Refugee Day 2006" hyperlink under "news release or
publication") [hereinafter News Release].
76. Health and Human Services in Malta, James Madison University, About
Malta: It's an Education and an Adventure Right in the Middle of the
MediterraneanOcean, (Sept. 6, 2008), http://www.iihhs.jmu.edu/malta/about.html.
77. See Derrick Lutterbeck, Small FrontierIsland: Malta and the Challenge of
IrregularImmigration, 20(1) MEDITERRANEAN Q. 119, 119-20 (2009), availableat
http://mq.dukejoumals.org/cgi/content/abstract/20/l/119 (arguing that even though
the number of seaborne immigrants coming to Malta's shores has been modest,
given the countries geographic makeup and sheer numbers in population, the
immigration issue stands as not only Malta's top priority, but also the EU's).
78. Background Note: Malta, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS,

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Oct. 2009), http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/5382.htm.
79. Id.
80. Id. This number equates to around 3000 people per square mile and is
dramatically different than the United States' fifty-five people per square mile
amount. Id.
81. See id. ("Possessing few indigenous raw materials and a very small
domestic market, Malta's economic development since the beginning of the 1990s
has been based on tourism.").
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via boat has increased dramatically. 82 What started as a slow leak of
boat people into Malta in the early 2000s has quickly progressed into a
steady stream of Africans showing up on the tiny island.83 From 2002
through 2006, 142 boats arrived in Malta carrying over 5700
immigrants. 84 In the first nine months of 2008, close to 2600 boat
people arrived from North Africa, 800 more than in the whole of
2007.85
Just as the immigration problem in Malta is intensified due to
86
minimal resources, scarce land area, and its proximity to Africa,
other Member States located "at the geographic periphery of the
EU,, 8 7 such as Cyprus and Greece, face numbers of immigrants
disproportionate to their availability of resources. 88 In 2004, the tiny
Italian island of Lampedusa, which is the closest Mediterranean entry
point for immigrants coming from North Africa,8 9 encountered 600
immigrants in one night alone. 90 Since then, Italy has reversed its
91
policy toward immigrants and deported hundreds back to Libya.
82. Betts, supra note 72, at 652.
83. Shaun Ley, Malta Struggles with Desperate Refugees, BBC NEWS, May 9,
2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hileurope/8040797.stm. In 2003, 500 people
were rescued by the Maltese. Id. Six years later, that number increased to 3400
people arriving. Id.
84. News Release, supra note 75. These figures were calculated according to

the following statistics: in 2002, twenty-one boats arrived carrying 1686 people; in
2003, twelve boats arrived carrying 502 people; in 2004, fifty-two boats arrived
carrying 1388 people; in 2005, forty-eight boats arrived carrying 1822 people; and
up to mid-June 2006, nine boats arrived carrying 378 people. Id.
85. Dozens Dead or Missing in the Gulf of Aden; Boat People Figures Rise,

UNHCR NEWS STORIES, Nov. 4, 2008, available at http://ochagwapps 1.unog.ch/rw/rwb.nsf/db900sid/EGUA-7L3MNF?OpenDocument.
86. See generally Background Note: Malta, supra note 78.
87. BRADY, supra note 13, at 7.
88. Id. Greece offers one of the EU's most permeable places of entry for
seaborne immigrants because its sizable shoreline extends out over an endless
number of islands. Id. at 20. In 2007 the country faced an elevated number of illegal
arrivals. Id.
89. Id. In 2006, 178 vessels carrying over 10,000 people arrived in
Lampedusa. Id.
90. JOANNE VAN SELM & BETSY COOPER, THE NEW "BOAT PEOPLE":
ENSURING SAFETY AND DETERMINING STATUS 62 (Migration Pol'y Inst. 2006),
available at http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/BoatPeopleReport.pdf.
91. Id.
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This has raised concerns with several human rights organizations,
such as the United Nations Refugee Agency, because they are
frequently denied access to these rejected immigrants and worry that
Italian officials ignore necessary precautions to ensure the
92
immigrants' safety upon their return to Libya.
B. Maltese Detention Centers
Calling the immigrant flow into Malta anything but a flood would
be unfair because the number of immigrants arriving in Malta is
equivalent to almost half of Malta's annual birthrate. 93 Considering
Malta's size, the numbers are even more staggering: one immigrant
landing in Malta is the equivalent of almost 1000 in Italy and over
1100 in Germany. 94 Because immigration procedures remain a
national responsibility, 95 as opposed to a supranational one, the
Maltese government feels forced to implement a detention policy to
limit the effect the immigrants have on the country. 96 The EU's
involvement in the matter has resulted in the creation of existing
regulations, such as the Dublin Regulation, that "place a
disproportionate responsibility on the states of southern Europe in the
absence of a clear EU responsibility-sharing mechanism." 97 Although
EU officials argue that a common asylum system like the Dublin
92. Id. at 62-63. UNCHR's is primarily concerned because:

Libya is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status
of a Refugees and is widely documented for its abuses of human rights;
There is no formal framework for dialogue and accountability in relations
between EU and Libya; While the EU as a whole engages in developing a
framework for dialogue with Libya on migration and other issues, the
gravity of the expulsion practice by Italy is being ignored.

See also Eur. Consult. Ass'n., Assessment of Transit and Processing Centres as a
Response to Mixed Flows of Migrants and Asylum Seekers, Doc. No. 11304 (2007)
(stating that the UNCHR has developed a ten-point plan of action to address the
immigrant problem in the Mediterranean).

93. European Parliament, Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home
Affairs, Report by the LIBE Committee Delegation on its Visit to the Administrative
Detention Centres in Malta, at 3, EUR. PARE. Doc. PV 613713 (March 30, 2006)
(preparedby Giusto Catania) [hereinafter Detention].

94.
95.
96.
97.

Id.
VAN SELM & COOPER, supra note 90, at 47.
Detention, supra note 93, at 3.
Betts, supra note 72, at 654.
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Regulation will eradicate human rights abuses and ensure immigrants
the necessary protections, so far these regulations have only fueled
98
human rights abuses in the central Mediterranean.
Many immigrants coming into Mediterranean Member States
from Africa are rescued at sea.99 However, tragedy frequently strikes
and transforms the Mediterranean's clear blue waters into a
graveyard. 100 The death toll of immigrants crossing the Mediterranean
from Africa, between 1993 to 2003, was approximated to be at least
10,000.101 Yet even when the immigrants survive the journey across
the sea, many possess no legal paperwork upon arrival, thus they are
not able to successfully enter Europe. 102
Typically, immigration procedures are left to the national
governments of EU Member States, 10 3 and Member States like Malta
have formed immigration policies to account for its "inability to
receive the foreigners arriving in successive waves, and inability to
settle them." 10 4 Notably, Malta's Immigration Act of September 21,
1970 and the Refugees Act of October 1, 2001, provide the basis for
Malta's generalized detention policy.' 0 5 Maltese law dictates that
98. BRADY, supra note 13, at 7.
99. See Q&A, supra note 11 ("Most people are rescued at sea; there are
incidents when only a small number of people survive.").
100. Between the Devil and the Deep Blue Sea: Mixed Migration to Europe,
UNHCR
NEWS
STORIES,
Oct.
5,
2007,
available
at

http://www.unhcr.org/470658fe4.html [hereinafter Migration] ("[H]undreds of
migrants and refugees continue to drown or simply disappear while attempting the
perilous crossings. 'Rarely a week goes by without some news of an unseaworthy
boat that has sunk with its passengers on board, dead bodies being washed ashore on
the holiday beaches of southern Europe,' said UNHCR's Assistant High
Commissioner for Protection Erika Feller.").
101. Maurizio Albahari, Death and the Modern State: Making Borders and
Sovereignty at the Southern Edges of Europe 3 (The Center for Comparative

Immigration Studies, Univ. of Cal., San Diego, Working Paper No. 137, 2006). This
number is purely speculative since many immigrant deaths go undocumented
because the boat and all the evidence sinks with them. Id. at 2 n.5-6.
102. Africans, supra note 12.
103. BRADY, supra note 13, at 7.
104. INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, LOCKING UP
FOREIGNERS, DETERRING REFUGEES: CONTROLLING MIGRATORY FLOWS IN MALTA 7

(Sept. 2004), available at http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/mt403a.pdf [hereinafter
LOCKING up FOREIGNERS].
105. Id. The Immigration Act of 1970 was amended in 2002 "to restrict,
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while illegal entry into Malta is not a criminal offense, it continues to
the punishment for
be considered an administrative one. 106 Further,
107
repatriation.
pending
detention
is
offense
this
Before 2005, the length of detention in Maltese immigration
centers was not defined. 10 8 However, currently, the time spent in these
centers cannot exceed eighteen months. 10 9 Immigrants and asylum
seekers are detained in one of four detention centers located on the
island: "Safi Barracks, a military structure which contains three
compounds for detainees; Hal Far Immigration Reception Centre; Ta'
Kandja Detention Centre[,] which is inside the headquarters of the
police Special Assignment Group ... [and] Lyster Barracks [in] Hal
Far, another military compound." 110 An army colonel from the
Maltese Military oversees the centers.Ill
The conditions in the administrative centers fall well below
normal decency standards. For example, toilets and showers are all
shared and doors are not equipped with locks. 1 2 Representatives of
Malta's Immigrants' Commission stated, at the time the centers were
created, their sole purpose was to accommodate equipment, not
people.11 3 The Commission also stated most of these centers lacked
14
respect for human rights.'
control and regulate immigration into Malta and to make provision for matters
ancillary thereto." Id. The Refugees Act of 2001 is meant "to make provisions
relating to and establishing procedures with regard to refugees and asylum seekers."

Id.
106. Detention, supra note 93, at 2.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. For asylum seekers waiting for the results of their appeals, the
maximum time is twelve months. Id. Because Malta has limited resources, detainees
at these "closed" centers can wait up to nine months before their first interview with
the Maltese Commission for Refugees. Id.
Malta,
in
Detention
Service,
Refugee
110. Jesuit
2010).
14,
Apr.
http:/www.jrsmalta.org/detention.html (last visited
111. Detention, supra note 93, at 2.
112. Q&A, supra note 11.
113. Detention, supra note 93, at 3.
114. Id. Upon arrival the immigrants are not interviewed and are given a form
to fill out in English. Id. Even at the first interview, which sometimes occurs months
later, an interpreter may not be present to lend any services if there has been a
massive influx of asylum seekers. Id.
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Further, in the men's Hal-Safi detention center, which has been
'
described as a "cage," 115
there are no sheets on the beds and the
mattresses are broken and dirty.116 Detainees have no access to an
outside area for fresh air and there is no heating in the center for cold
nights. 117 In addition, the immigrants are presented with deplorable
conditions: the showers are broken, there is no hot water available, the
toilets do not have doors and are in total disrepair, and there is dirt
118
everywhere throughout the facility.
Moreover, trained military personnel guard the detainees and,
because regulations are silent as to how the centers should operate,
especially with regard to prisoner rights and the guards' decisionmaking powers, many decisions on prisoner treatment are
discretionary. 1 9 In fact, "information concerning these facilities... is
not made public. It can only be checked indirectly by talking to the
few people (lawyers, NGOs [nongovernmental organizations],
religious representatives) who have access to them or have lived
there."

120

Malta's cautious behavior towards releasing information about the
closed centers has drawn complaints from the United Nations Human
Rights Commission. 121 These centers, some of which are merely
converted military barracks, are crowded with African immigrants,
some of whom are from opposite warring factions back home. 122 One
official's remarks show the gravity of the detention centers' problems:
"The conditions are really horrible, shameful ... . I'm embarrassed to

be Maltese and have this situation here."' 123 Additionally, a twenty115.

AMNESTY INT'L, AMNESTY INT'L REPORT 2007: HuMAN RIGHTS IN

REPUBLIC OF MALTA.

116. Id. "A delegation of the [EU Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and
Home Affairs], visiting four detention centres, -found that the Hal-Safi detention
centre 'was like a cage."' Id.

117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See LOCKING UP FOREIGNERS, supra note 104, at 11.
120. Id.
121. Jennifer Carlile, Malta Offers a Station to Nowhere, MSNBC.COM, June
20, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18982936/ns/worldnews-frontier-europe.

122. Id.
123. Id. This statement can be attributed to the head of UNHCR's Malta
office, Neil Falzon. Id.
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four-year-old immigrant from Chad described the conditions in Malta:
We can't go
"[i]t's no better than Chad, but we can't do anything.
124
forward and we can't go back. We can do nothing."'
C. Malta's Search and Rescue Area and InternationalLaw
Malta is situated directly in the central Mediterranean Sea, thus
maritime traffic is unavoidable. Importantly, the responsibility to save
people who are at risk on the high seas is a maritime obligation
explicit in multiple international laws; the duty one owes after rescue,
however, remains unclear. 125 Notably, the United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea ("UNCLOS") imposes a duty on the "flag
state" 126 to render assistance to any persons who are in distress on the
high seas. 127 Significantly, Article 98(1) of UNCLOS, dealing with the
duty to render assistance, reads:
Every State shall require the master of a ship flying its flag, in so
far as he can do so without serious danger to the ship, the crew or
the passengers: (a) to render assistance to any person found at sea in
danger of being lost; (b) to proceed with all possible speed to the
rescue of persons in distress, if informed of their need of assistance,
128
in so far as such action may reasonably be expected of him ....
Additionally, the Geneva Convention on the High Seas of 1958, and
the London Convention on the Safety of Life at Sea ("SOLAS"), also
1 29 .
afford protection to distressed persons at sea.
While Malta is dwarfed in size by other nations, the Maltese
Search and Rescue Region ("SRR") area is vast, covering more than
124. Id.
125. Nessel, supra note 62, at 632.
126. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982,
U.N.T.S., art. 98(1). "Flag state" refers to the state under whose flag the rescuing
ship sails. See id. The flag state must assume jurisdiction under its internal law over
each ship flying its flag and over technical and social matters concerning the ship.
Id. art. 94(2)(b).
127. Id. art. 98(1).
128. Id.
129. Michael Pugh, Europe's Boat People: Maritime Cooperation in the
(2000),
3,
56
STUD.
WEU
SEC.
FOR
Mediterranean, INST.

http://www.aei.pitt.edu/501/01/chai4Ie.html#_ftn94.
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250,000 square kilometers.' 30 The SRR is approximately the same size
as Great Britain and spans from Tunisia to Greece.' 3 1 Many boats
entering Malta's SRR are overflowing with immigrants aboard crafts
that are rarely seaworthy. 132 With international maritime law
obligating the Maltese authorities to assist boats in distress in Malta's
SRR, 133 many of these immigrants reach Malta when the Armed
134
Forces of Malta rescue them at sea.
Coupled with the EU's Dublin Regulation, Malta's SRR adds
more people to an island already swollen with immigrants. 135 Various
Maltese officials have proposed to reduce the SRR, claiming its
current size is "hindering the country's ability to handle the illegal
immigration problem effectively."'1 36 However, Malta's government
has vetoed this suggestion. 137 Maltese officials have also rejected
Italian requests for Malta to relinquish segments of its SRR in an
1 38
effort to reduce immigrant arrivals via rescues at sea.
The feud over the SRR between Malta and Italy has little to do
with a desire to acquire more immigrants. The nations seek benefits
from patrolling larger regions including financial services for their
respective coastal agencies, a potential increase in lucrative fishing
130. Search and Rescue (SAR) in Malta, Search and Rescue Training Centre,
http://sarmalta.gov.mt/sar-inMalta.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
131. Herman Grech & Kurt Sansone, Shrinking Malta's Search and Rescue
Area is 'Not an Option,' TIMES OF MALTA, Apr. 26, 2009.
132. See Migration, supra note 100.
133. See Nessel, supra note 62, at 632.
134. See Search and Rescue (SAR) in Malta, supra note 130 ("The primary
responsibility for the co-ordination of all SAR cases within the Maltese SRR lies
with the Armed Forces of Malta.").
135. See discussion infra Parts II.A., III.A.
136. See Grech & Sansone, supra note 131 ("Prof. Cassola maintains that
Malta should relinquish a large part of its search and rescue region until it is given
sufficient financial and human resources to man it."). The same official asks "Why
should we [Malta] risk taking on a bigger chunk of the immigration problem to get
some money in return"? Id.
137. See id. ("The [Maltese] Cabinet had shot down a proposal ...to shrink
the SAR area by some 70 per cent.").
138. Id. ("Dr. Mifsud Bonnici [Malta's Foreign and Home Affairs Minister]
said: 'There is no discussion on the size of our search and rescue area. It would be
wrong to argue that Malta should give up its search and rescue zone because of the
current problem with illegal immigration."').
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and more importantly, potential oil exploration.' 39 In addition, Malta's
reluctance to surrender portions of its SRR to Italy is logical because
Malta receives millions of Euros every year4 0 in air traffic control fees
for allowing aircrafts to utilize its airspace.
Other officials argue, however, that profits from the airspace do
not outweigh the glaring human risks associated with taking on more
immigrants. 14 These officials propose to yield parts of the SRR until
142
adequate financial and human resources are in place to maintain it.
In the alternative, the international community could intervene
because international maritime law requires coastal states make
arrangements to provide adequate services in their coastal waters. 143
D. The PinarIncident
April 2009 brought more debate between Italy and Malta
regarding their respective search and rescue zones and the duties owed
under international law, specifically under the Search and Rescue
Convention. 144 A Turkish cargo ship named Pinar,which was packed
with approximately 140 inmuigrants, was granted access to disembark
on the island of Sicily based on humanitarian grounds, following the
Maltese government's refusal to accept the ship. 145 The immigrants
lingered in international waters for three days while the two Member
States disputed who was responsible for taking them in. 1 46 As the two
Member States feuded, a fifteen-year-old girl and a pregnant woman
who needed to be evacuated off the ship passed away amidst the

139. Id. ("Benefits range from funding for the Italian Guardia Costiera, to
fishing zones, and even oil exploration.").
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id. Professor Arnold Cassola has stated that Malta should not risk taking
on more of the immigration problem just to receive some money in return. Id.
143. International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue, ch. 2.1.1., Apr.
27, 1979, S. Treaty Doc. No. 96-45.
144. See Italy: Immigrants Land in Sicily After Rejection by Malta,
at
available
2009,
20,
Apr.
INT'L,
ADNKRONOS

http://www.adnkronos.com/AKI/English/Security/?id=3.0.3233123625# [hereinafter
Italy].

145. Id.
146.

Id.
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47
extreme conditions aboard the vessel. 1
The tragedy started when the two boats carrying the immigrants
began to take on water. 148 Pinar,which was passing nearby, plucked
the drowning immigrants from the sea.' 49 A spokesperson from the
Maltese Army Rescue Coordination Center stated that because Pinar
was the closest ship to the immigrants, the Maltese requested the ship
intervene. 150 Italy argued that because Pinarrescued the immigrants in
5
Malta's SRR, the Maltese were responsible for the immigrants.' '
Malta responded by pointing to international conventions, saying the
safest and closest port of call, the Italian island of Lampedusa, owed
the duty to the rescued immigrants. 152
The Pinar incident underscores a major concern regarding the
proper interpretation of countries' duties under the Search and Rescue
Convention. Italy's insistence that Malta take in any and all rescued in
Malta's SRR signals a troubling and dangerous change in immigration
policies from Malta's neighbors that would make Malta responsible
for all persons rescued in its SRR regardless of whether a safer port of
153
call exists (e.g., the Italian island of Lampedusa in the Pinar case).
Therefore, the immigrants' final destination in the Pinar case was
extremely important for Malta because accepting the immigrants
would have appeared as an admission that Italy's revised reading of
154
the Search and Rescue Convention was correct.
International law currently requires that rescuers transport persons
to the nearest and safest port of call.155 Recently, Member States along
the EU's southern border, such as Italy and Spain, have been
advocating for modification within the International Maritime

147. Raphael Vassallo, Politics, Legal Wrangling at Heart of Malta-Italy
Standoff,
MALTA
TODAY,
Apr.
19,
2009,
available
at

http://www.maltatoday.com.mt/2009/04/19/tI0.html.
148.

Italy, supra note 144.

149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Vassallo, supra note 147.
Id.

155.

IrregularMigrationby Sea: Frequently Asked Questions, ASYLUM IN THE

UN, May 28, 2009, http://www.unhcr.org/4ale48f66.html.
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Organization. 156 This modification would result in the coordinating
Member State (the Member State's SRR in which the immigrants are
rescued) rather than the safest port of call, holding responsibility for
the immigrants.' 57 Malta's vehement objection to its neighbors' ideas
is reflected in its reluctance to ratify changes to international maritime
law. 158 Many involved in the EU believe the positions embraced by
Italy and Spain59 are an effort to pressure Malta into ceding its
profitable SRR.1
IV. THE REGION OF ORIGIN APPROACH

A. The Root of the Immigration Problem: Crossing
the Sea to Offer Help
Prior approaches to immigration in the Mediterranean have
focused mainly on the symptoms, rather than examining the reasons
for so many Africans migrating north. 1 60 A survey conducted in 2000,
representing a small portion of immigrants, shows where immigrants
come from and why. 16 ' A majority of immigrants stated they migrated
to the EU because of what many would call "push factors," economic
162
and political hardships forcing them to leave their home countries.
Most of the human rights violations African immigrants suffer, as
well as the Africans' subsequent migration into Europe, occur for
Organization,
Maritime
International
generally
156. See
http://www.imo.org/HOME.HTML (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) ("The Convention
establishing the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was adopted in Geneva
IMO's main task has been to develop and maintain a comprehensive
in 1948 ....
regulatory framework for shipping and its remit today includes safety,
environmental concerns, legal matters, technical co-operation, maritime security and
the efficiency of shipping.").
157. Grech & Sansone, supra note 131.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Betts, supra note 72, at 653. Even less prevalent is the idea of instituting a
more comprehensive approach centered on engagement with the region of origin. Id.
161. Id. at 657 ("[T]he civil war in Sierra Leone [,] ... the ethnic and religious
conflict in Nigeria, the civil conflict in the Ivory Coast, the onward movement of
Liberians [,] ... and the widespread insecurity in the DRC, in particular, all point to
how many are likely to have been fleeing a well founded fear of persecution.").
162. Id.
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political reasons.1 63 The problems are exacerbated by the fact that
many African nations are unable to sustain democratic governments
due to continuous cycles of vicious coups and military
dictatorships. 64 Consequently, glaring human rights abuses occur in
several parts of Africa, often supervised by the state.' 65 Countries
where severe human rights abuses are well documented include the
Democratic Republic of the Congo ("DRC"), Sierra Leone, Liberia,
66
Sudan, and C6te d'Ivoire.1
Political instability in Africa has had an impact across the
Mediterranean as well because it increases African immigration into
the EU. 167 Southern Europe is especially familiar with this
phenomenon; since the early 1990s, a flood of North Africans have
attempted to make the perilous trek across the Mediterranean to reach
mainland Europe. 168 In addition, since 2000, there has been an
increase in irregular immigration from sub-Saharan Africans, who
now make up the "largest category of irregular boat migrants." 169 In
response to the increased immigration, "European states intensified
border controls and have attempted to 'externalize' these policies by
pressuring certain North African countries to clamp down on irregular
migration."' 17 The European response to irregular immigration has
failed to prevent immigration and has resulted in "increasing
violations of migrants' rights and a diversification of trans-Saharan

163.

See generally FIONA TEXEIRE, AT THE GATE OF FORTRESS EUROPE:

IRREGULAR

IMMIGRATION

IN

MALTA

23-24

(2006),

available

at

http://www.altemattiva.org.mt/filebank/documents/Fiona%20TEXEIRE%20At%20the%2OGate%20of%2OFortress%20Europe.pdf.
164. Id. at 23.
165. Id. at 23-24 ("[G]reat instability ...
was mainly the result of
marginalization

of certain ethnic groups and graft under . . . leaders. Many

politicians have used the positions of power to ignite ethnic conflicts that had been
exacerbated, or even created, under colonial rule.").
166. Id. at 24.
167. See HEIN DE HAAS, IRREGULAR MIGRATION FROM WEST AFRICA TO THE
MAGHREB AND THE EUROPEAN UNION: AN OVERVIEW OF RECENT TRENDS 9 (2008)

("[T]here
migration
168.
169.
170.

has been an incontestable increase in regular and irregular West African
to Europe over the past decade.").
Id.
Id.
Id. at 10.
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171

migration routes."
Some scholars propose that a comprehensive engagement with the
countries of origin is the best solution to combating immigrant human
rights abuses in the EU. 172 This approach applies both preventative
and mitigating procedures that relate to immigrants and the causes of
their "distress[ed] migration." 173 Reconstruction and peace building
initiatives are suggested as specific procedures for fixing the root
cause of African immigration. 174 Proponents of this approach argue
that if the root cause of immigration is addressed, then more
incentives will be put into place for immigrants to stay in their
countries of origin. 175 The EU applied this method when it committed
troops to de-escalate the conflict in the DRC and provided funding for
institution building. 176 However, cooperation between service
providers and other humanitarian efforts was limited and often
77
problematic. 1
The regional solution approach, while idealistic in nature, fails to
overcome the problems associated with a lack of international
cooperation and humanitarian aid. The regional approach naively
assumes a robust relationship between coordinating agencies in
Africa, the EU, and national governments, despite the fact that
successful international cooperation on refugee policy in Africa has
171. Id.
172. See Betts, supra note 72, at 654-55.
173. Id. at 669:
In the context of a Mediterranean Solution, comprehensive
engagement with countries of origin needs to imply both preventative and
palliative measures.... [E]ngaging with the country of origin is the most
crucial but also the most complex element of a viable long-term solution.
It requires a coordinated approach that spans the areas of migration,
development, peace-building, and post-conflict resolution.
174. Id. at 670.
175. Id.
176.

See

DAVID

MCKEEVER

ET

AL.,

FOREIGN

TERRITORY:

THE

INTERNATIONALISATION OF EU ASYLUM POLICY 107 (2005) ("The EU is active in a

wide range of sectors, from infrastructure to health, food security, policing, and
justice. In addition, the EU played a prominent role in conflict reduction through its
deployment of Operation Artemis in Ituri district in mid-2003.").
177. See id. ("Despite the large numbers of Congolese refugees and asylum
seekers in Europe, the DRC has not been the focus of specific grants through the
migration co-operation budget.").
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been "extremely rare." 178 Logically, the regional solution's success
relies heavily on substantial coordination amongst the proper
governmental and non-governmental agencies.
For example, Operation Artemis ("Operation") 179 depicts the high
level of coordination needed when adopting a region of origin
approach to resolve conflict in Africa. In 2003, the EU sent troops to
the DRC to help stabilize the region. 180 While the French military
represented a majority of the forces involved, the EU determined the
Operation's planning and rules of engagement.' 81 While the
headquarters for the Operation were based in Paris and included
eighty officers gathered from all over Europe, the military command
center was based in Entebbe, Uganda, "serv[ing] as a logistical hub to
dispatch the necessary forces to Bunia."' 82 The Political and Security
Committee was responsible for the political control and strategic
direction of the Operation, "including the power to amend the
operational plan, the chain of command and the rules of
engagement."' 183 This layered approach, involving numerous parties
situated in different geographic regions, produced questionable
results. 184 Some shortcomings included "the need for better and secure
means for long-distance communications, better information
technology, intelligence sharing and the need to improve the
178. See Betts, supra note 72, at 671.
179. Kees Homan, Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo,
in FASTER AND MORE UNITED? THE DEBATE ABOUT EUROPE'S CRISIS RESPONSE

CAPABILITIEs 151, 151 (2007):
In June 2003, the EU sent Operation [Artemis], to the Democratic
Republic of Congo. .

.

. The objective of Operation Artemis was to

contribute to the stabilisation of the security conditions in Bunia, capital of
Ituri, to improve the humanitarian situation, and to ensure the protection of
displaced persons in the refugee camps in Bunia.
180. MCKEEVER ET AL., supra note 176 ("[T]he EU resumed formal
development cooperation with the DRC in 2003. The EU is active in a wide range of
sectors, from infrastructure to health, food security, policing and justice .... [T]he
EU played a prominent role in conflict reduction through its deployment of
Operation Artemis.").
181. Homan, supra note 179, at 152.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 153. The Political and Security Committee is under the
responsibility of the European Council to which it reports regularly. Id.
184. See MCKEEVERETAL., supra note 176, at 77.
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1 85
interoperability of European armed forces."'
Another example of the shortcomings of the region of origin
approach in Africa is reflected by the problems relief agencies face.
The EU agency responsible for humanitarian aid in crisis regions, the
European Commission Humanitarian Aid Department ("ECHO"),
provides relief supplies and services through intermediary
organizations. 186 Logically, without UN troops keeping these crisis
regions secure, ECHO's ability to provide food assistance,
vaccinations, road and house reconstruction, and other aid related
programs in countries like the DRC would certainly be limited and
probably nonexistent. 187 With UN troops in the DRC incapable of
night flights and faced with a shortage of ammunition on the
weekends, one commanding UN general stated "the UN will not be
able to protect the tens of thousands of refugees there" if rebels
attack. 188 Without agencies facilitating aid in an organized and
coordinated effort, a region of origin approach will ultimately fail.
Assuming interagency collaboration results in improved peace
talks and healthier, sustainable living conditions, any respite in89
conflict is typically short-lived due to Africa's political instability.'

After the Operation demilitarized the city of Bunia, the transition to
"Bangladeshi-led MONUC forces" had mixed success.1 90 The arms

185. Homan, supra note 179, at 154.
186. UNITED NATIONS REGIONAL INFORMATION CENTRE FOR WESTERN
EUROPE (UNRIC),

COOPERATE

HOW THE EUROPEAN

(2007),

available

UNION

at

AND

THE UNITED NATIONS

http://www.auswaertiges-

amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/InternatOrgane/VereinteNationen/Downloads/Lepore
llo__EU-VNe.pdf.

187. See generally European Commission Humanitarian

Aid & Civil

Protection, Democratic Republic of Congo: Posing Significant Humanitarian

Challenges, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/aid/sub-saharian/rdcen.htm (last visited Apr.
14, 2010). Other services funded by ECHO in the DRC include: "survival kits for
83,000 displaced people; repatriation of 20,000 refugees ....

improved access to

clean water for 110,000 people; seeds and tools support to 56,000 households; [and]
care for 9800 victims of sexual violence." Id.
188. Andrew Mitchell, DCR's Stricken People Need More UN Aid,
at
23,
2008,
available
INDEPENDENT,
Nov.
http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/commentators/andrew-mitchell-dcrsstricken-people-need-more-un-aid- 1031033.html.
189. See TEXEIRE, supra note 163, at 23.
190. Homan, supra note 179, at 153.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2010

25

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 40, No. 2 [2010], Art. 5

360 CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 40

smuggling continued, and women and children were massacred in an
191
attack on the outskirts of the city.
Applying interagency collaboration to develop a comprehensive
approach to handling immigration concerns in a particular region is
not impossible, depending on the region's political atmosphere. In
fact, the International Conference for Refugees in Central America
("CIREFCA") resulted in some success. 19 2 This initiative "sought
solutions for a regional refugees situation based on, firstly, inter-state
cooperation and, secondly, inter-agency collaboration across issue193
areas."
During the 1970s and 80s, Central America was ravaged "by war,
civil strife and widespread human rights abuses that forced nearly 2
million people from their homes." 194 Faced with this situation, leaders
of these Central American countries began to pursue regional
solutions concerning refugees. 195 After the regional leaders established
refugee concerns as a top priority, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees ("UNHCR") and other agencies were
afforded a unique opportunity to convert this priority into concrete
humanitarian aid. 196 The UNHCR "utilized political developments in
the region, seeing it as a chance to start talking about real long-term
solutions to refugee problems, and not just assistance programmes." 197
Without political cooperation in the region, it is hard to imagine
198
UNHCR and CIREFCA's platform being successful.
191. Id.
192. See generally Ron Redmond, The Human Side of CIREFCA, REFUGEES
MAG., Mar. 1, 1995, available at http://www.unhcr.org/publ/PUBL/3b5426de4.html
("CIREFCA was a highly successful international effort that ... spelled hope for
hundreds of thousands of refugees, returnees, displaced persons and undocumented
aliens in seven Latin American countries.").
193. Betts, supra note 72, at 665.
194. Redmond, supra note 192.
195. Id. (stating that after the Central American leaders signed the "Esquipulas
II" accords, CIREFCA was created to attend to the high volumes of refugees and
displaced persons, who were a direct result of conflict in the region).
196. Id. (explaining that this aid consisted of protection and assistance in
employment, health, education and, most importantly, security). CIREFCA also
helped with repatriation and resettlement as long as it was voluntary and
individually expressed. Id.
197. Id.
198. See id. ("[T]he real success of CIREFCA is due to the commitment of
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CIREFCA's approach and its subsequent success in Central
America, while somewhat inspiring, offers little hope for a
comprehensive refugee solution in the Mediterranean region. The EU
problem (for Member States like Malta, Cyprus, and Greece) presents
two distinguishing obstacles that were not present in Central America
during the 1980s. First, refugees crossing the Mediterranean come
from various African countries; thus the solution would need to entail
a multifaceted approach involving cooperation between many national
governments. 199 The destination, transit, host, and origin countries
would all need to cooperate fully to resolve the refugee crisis. 20 0 This
is unlike the Central American situation, where refugees stayed within
the region instead of traveling through countries to a different
continent.2 °1
Second, unlike the regional leaders in Latin America, who labeled
the refugee crisis a grave concern, African leadership faces political
instability and other related problems. 20 2 This is due in large part to
the fact that African governments constantly change due to a cycle of
civil wars plaguing the region. 20 3 For example, rebel groups in Angola
and Sierra Leone are funded through "conflict diamonds" and act
contrary to the international community's objectives of restoring
peace. 20 4 Historically, the Sierra Leonean rebel group Revolutionary
United Front ("RUF") has waged war on citizens and intimidated the
government. 20 5 Liberia, another war-torn country, as recently as 2003,
Central American leaders, who finally said enough is enough and decided to work
together for peace and development.").
199. Betts, supra note 72, at 667.
200. Id. at 666 ("[S]tates at each of these levels would have specific roles and
responsibilities.").
201. See Redmond, supra note 192 ("CIREFCA was a highly successful
international effort that over the past five years spelled hope for hundreds of
thousands of refugees, returnees, displaced persons, and undocumented aliens in

seven Latin American countries.").
202. ANTONY OTIENO ONG'AYO, POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN AFRICA WHERE
THE PROBLEM LIES AND ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES (African Diaspora Pol. Ctr.

2008).
203. TEXEIRE, supra note 163, at 23.
Diamonds,
Conflict
Info.:
Pub.
of
Dept.
204. UN
http://www.un.org/peace/africa/Diamond.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2010).
205. Id. A seventeen-year-old boy lost both of his hands to a rebel's machete
at the waterloo camp in Sierra Leone. Id.; see also GlobalSecurity.org,
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experienced massive civil strife when an armed opposition group,
Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy ("LURD"),
launched an incursion on the government. 20 6 While the fighting
ensued, a new faction broke off from the LURD opposition group and
joined the fight.20 7
Because it is unclear who has the authority to organize and direct
humanitarian efforts in the countries creating the highest amounts of
migratory exodus, 20 8 a comprehensive approach involving the region
of origin is not only daunting, but naive and unrealistic. The better
alternative to reduce human rights abuses in the EU is a
comprehensive approach involving national and supranational
cooperation amongst all EU Member States.
B. Existing BilateralAgreements
With immigration into the EU still increasing, 20 9 "many outside
210
Europe presume there would be a pan-EU approach to this issue."
In reality, the actual handling of immigration, especially by sea, still
concerns national governments. 211 Among EU Member States, only
Italy and Malta possess specific bilateral agreements concerning
immigration issues with Libya. 212 These agreements come as a
response to Malta and Italy being the two EU Member States most
impacted by seaborne immigrant arrivals.213
Italy's bilateral agreement with Libya, for example, permits Italy
Revolutionary
United
Front
(RUF),
http://globalsecurity.org/military/
world/para/ruf.htm (last visited Apr. 14, 2010) (describing the RUF's nine-year
armed struggle against Sierra Leone's corrupt government).
206. WATCHLIST ON CHILDREN AND ARMED CONFLICT, NOTHING LEFT TO
LOSE: THE LEGACY OF ARMED CONFLICT AND LIBERIA'S CHILDREN 6-7 (2004),

available at http://www.watchlist.org/reports/pdf/liberia.report.pdf.
207. Id. The new faction for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL) was backed by
the government of C6te d'Ivoire. Id. The LURD faction was allegedly supported
through funds from the government of Guinea. Id.
208. See generally discussion supra Part II.
209. See discussion supra Part IV.A.
210. VAN SELM & COOPER, supra note 90, at 17.
211. Id. at 16.
212. Id. at 64. The agreements focus on the procedures of immigrant
readmission into the transit country of Libya. Id.
213.

Id. at 46.
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to patrol Libya's massive coastline. 214 Further, Italy provides financial
backing to Libya for holding camps and for removing immigrants
from Libya back to their original countries of origin. 21 5 Libya's leader,
Gaddafi, traveled to Italy in June of 2009 to celebrate the ratification
of an Italian-Libyan "Friendship Treaty" that has already resulted in
joint naval patrols.216 As part of the "Friendship Treaty," Italy has
agreed to return immigrants to Libya and donate more than 200
million dollars over the next twenty-five years for infrastructure
projects in Libya. 217 Critics of this and other agreements have said the
EU is turning a blind eye and allowing national governments to run
roughshod over immigrants' rights.2 18 They have the right to be
skeptical: Libya is not a party to the Refugee Convention and has no
common asylum system. 219 Furthermore, immigrants interviewed by
Humans Rights Watch confirmed their exposure to inhumane
conditions and indefinite detention by Libyan authorities.22 °
Bilateral agreements such as the "Friendship Treaty" offer little
clarity about the treatment of immigrants who are returned to Africa.
Further, both the European Parliament and the European Court of
Human Rights have expressed concern by demanding greater
transparency in such bilateral agreements between Libya and other
African countries.22 1

Although these agreements may be portrayed as a step towards
correcting human rights abuses by politicians, closer examination
reveals that they are merely used as a vehicle to dump immigrants
214. Id. at 48.
215. Id.
216.

See Gaddafi, supra note 20.

217. Id.
218. Id.; see generally Sara Hamood, EU-Libya Cooperationon Migration:A
Raw Deal For Refugees And Migrants?, 21 J. REFUGEE STuD. (2008) (discussing

Libya's actions of returning immigrants to countries of danger and systematically
disregarding the rights of immigrants).
219. Id.; see also Herrera, supra note 19.
220. See Gaddafi, supra note 20. A twenty-four-year-old Eritrean immigrant
describes his account of abuse, beatings, and ill treatment while in prison. Id.
221. See id. ("The UN High Commissioner for Refugees expressed 'deep
concern' regarding the fate of the interdicted migrants . . . saying that they were
returned to Libya 'without proper assessment of their possible protection needs."').
Human Rights Watch has also expressed its concern for the treatment of immigrants
who are arrested trying to flee Libya. Id.
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back in Africa while ignoring their obvious fate upon return. 222 The
main problem lies in other EU Member States labeling seaborne
immigrants as an Italian or Maltese problem because the impact of
immigration is not felt the same way by all Member States. 223 As long
as immigrants are funneled back to Africa through these agreements
and immigration procedures are left to the national governments,
human rights abuses will continue until a comprehensive solution
224
involving all Member States is implemented.
V. MODIFICATIONS TO THE DUBLIN REGULATION AND FRONTEX:
INCREASING ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY IN THE EU

Although individual Member States' policies appear mindful of
immigration concerns, 225 the EU community should implement a
supranational approach in order to truly increase Member States'
accountability to arriving immigrants. Current bilateral agreements on
a national level and collaboration with the region of origin will do
little to combat the serious humanitarian challenge that African
immigrants present. 226 Furthermore, existing EU policies addressing
the issue, including the Dublin Regulation, perpetuate the problem by
forcing immigrants to remain in the EU Member States in which they
first arrive, disproportionately pushing immigrants into Mediterranean
Member States. 227 As a result, an immigration crisis which should be
treated as a European dilemma is reverted to a national one that is
only felt in the Mediterranean. 228 This problem has only been
intensified by the fact that international law is unclear as to the
222. See Gaddafi, supra note 20:
Italy's summary return of boat people to Libya also indicates that it
may be reneging on its own obligations under international law not to
return people to places where their lives or freedom would be threatened.
• . or where they would face inhuman and degrading treatment ....
Accounts from immigrants about brutal treatment and the lack of asylum
law and procedures in Libya raise grave concerns about the safety of the
immigrants that Italy returns to Libyan shores.
223. VAN SELM & COOPER, supra note 90, at 47.
224. See generally id. at 47.
225. See discussion supra Part II.
226. See discussion supra Part IV.
227. See discussion supra Part II.A.
228. VAN SELM & COOPER, supra note 90, at 47.
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229
obligations owed to immigrants following a rescue at sea.

A. A Proposalto Modify the Dublin Regulation
The EU should make it a top priority to ensure the safe arrival of
asylum seekers into Europe. To date, the standards employed to
protect immigrants entering the EU have raised serious concerns. 230 In
particular, the Dublin Regulation, which places responsibility for
231
assessing immigrants' asylum claims on individual Member States,
is intrinsically flawed for the reasons discussed below. This proposal
does not intend to replace the existing regulation but instead aims to
alleviate the current strains caused by various inadequacies in the
regulation. The proposal will address two main problems in the
Dublin Regulation and offer solutions.
The first major issue with the current Dublin Regulation is that it
does not comprehensively address detention policies, even though
many EU Member States "are increasingly using detention in order to
enforce transfer under the Dublin system" 232 and the "available
information suggests the system is expensive, inefficient, and places
disproportionate pressures on Member States that make up the EU's
external southern... borders." 233 Detention also negatively affects
immigrants' rights because asylum seekers in detention often have no
access to procedural safeguards such as legal advice. 234 This problem
is illustrated in the Maltese context, where asylum seekers often wait
nine months until speaking with anyone about leaving detention.235
Furthermore, many asylum applicants come from countries where
229. Nessel, supra note 62, at 632.
230. See discussion supra Parts II-IV.
231. See Summaries, supra note 32.

232. EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND ExILEs, REPORT ON THE
3 (2006), available at
http://www.detention-in-europe.org/images/stories/ecre%20report%20dubii.pdf
[hereinafter REGULATION].
233. EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES, COMMENTS FROM THE
APPLICATION OF THE DUBLIN II REGULATION IN EUROPE

EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES ON THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION
PROPOSAL TO RECAST THE DUBLIN REGULATION 3 (2009), available at

http://www.ecre.org/files/ECRE_.Response ToRecastDublinRegulation_2009.
pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION].
234. REGULATION, supra note 232, at 162.
235. Detention, supra note 93.
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they have been previously detained and beaten, and additional
236
detention would likely cause serious psychological harm.
Accordingly, explicit language in the regulation should preclude
Member States from detaining asylum seekers arbitrarily to reduce
detention costs and to ensure the detainees' fundamental rights to
freedom.
Even in situations where detention is deemed proper by Member
States, procedural safeguards such as time limits and access to legal
assistance should be adopted to ensure the detained immigrants' legal
rights are preserved. This means once a person is detained, the
responsible Member State should be required to inform the detainee of
the steps necessary to leave detention. An ideal proposal would
require the Member State to inform detainees of these rights within
thirty days of detention or face sanctions from the EU.
The second major issue with the Dublin Regulation is its lack of
emphasis on a solution to the detention crisis in the Mediterranean that
involves cooperation between all Member States. Small nations like
Malta, with minimal capacity to take in immigrants, deserve help from
other Member States, especially if mandatory detention policies are
eradicated in the future. The cooperation between Member States
would also allow the EU to implement a per se policy forbidding
bilateral agreements between individual Member States and African
countries that are not signatories to the 1952 Refugee Convention.
This would eliminate concerns about human rights abuses inflicted on
immigrants who are returned to Africa.
The first step the EU should take in order to reduce the tensions
caused by detention and repatriation is to propose temporary
suspensions of immigrant transfers to Member States with no capacity
to hold asylum seekers. 237 This would both lighten the load on the
Mediterranean Member States located on the frontline of the
immigrant flow and ensure that asylum seekers are afforded proper
procedural safeguards and decent living conditions. The next step the
EU should take is to implement a mandatory burden-sharing
mechanism that not only allows bilateral agreements between EU
Member States, but also compels Member States to facilitate the
REGULATION, supra note 232, at 162.
237. Monika Zaleska, The ProposedEU Asylum Reforms, T.M.C. ASSER INST.
1, 1(2009).

236.
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transfer of immigrants from overburdened Member States like Malta.
B. Fixing Frontex
Until now, the EU's main concern has been patrolling its borders
through the use of Frontex. 238 As a result, a "mistrust of formal
migratory channels" has promoted dangerous smuggling practices by
human traffickers. 239 Frontex has engaged in operations with almost
no transparency, and reports suggest its presence only increases
human rights abuses. 240 Its role should focus on both aiding boats in
distress, and more importantly, helping rescued immigrants who need
to be taken from Member States facing a full capacity of immigrants.
If the EU implements a mandatory burden-sharing mechanism,
Frontex patrols would no longer have to be concerned about Member
States feuding over taking in boat people. Member States, like Malta
and Italy, could avoid conflicts like the Pinarincident because even if
they took in sea-stranded immigrants, the revised Dublin proposal
would not force these Member States to be responsible for the
immigrants in the long term.
The EU should next allocate the authority and responsibility for
compiling statistical and social data to determine which Member
States can no longer take in immigrants. Although it is important for
Member States to have their sovereign powers, the EU needs to
delegate authority to supranational organizations. These organizations
should have the ability to penetrate European detention centers in an
effort to determine if particular Member States have the capacity to
take on more immigrants. Such a policy would promote transparency
and ensure that any human rights abuses would come to light. This
sort of policy would particularly help minimize concerns regarding the
detention policies in Malta and other coastal Mediterranean Member
States.
VI. CONCLUSION

Modifying the Dublin Regulation is the most important step to
eradicating human rights abuses in Southern Europe. The
238. See discussion supra Part II.A.
239. COMMISSION, supra note 233, at 4.
240. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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modifications would also lessen the immigration burden on coastal
Mediterranean Member States. This is particularly important because
the immigrant flood into the EU shows no signs of decreasing or
stopping anytime soon. 24 1 The EU now needs to shift its focus to
implementing a comprehensive solution that involves the cooperation
and collaboration of all Member States, regardless of their location in
the region. If the Dublin Regulation remains in its current form, the
limited capacity of coastal Mediterranean Member States to house
immigrants will result in these Member States sending immigrants
24 2
back to Africa.
The proposed modifications discussed in this Comment are a step
towards harmonizing current EU immigration law. Because an
immigration solution involves multiple players in numerous national
governments, the process of harmonization will take years, maybe
decades. However, the EU should no longer turn a blind eye and treat
humans as objects to be shipped back and forth. A new approach is
needed. As one Chief of the Refugee Council in the UK noted,
"[a]sylum seekers are being treated as packages to be processed and
removed rather than as very vulnerable human beings." 243 Until this
practice is stamped out, the voice of asylum seekers in the EU will be
drowned out by existing immigration policies.
Nicholas De Blouw*

241. See generally Boat People Arrivals in the Mediterranean,Gulf of Aden
Already Top 2007, UNHCR NEWS STORIES, Nov. 4, 2008, available at

http://www.unhcr.org/4910397810.html.
242.

See discussion supra Part IV.B.

243. Zaleska, supra note 237.
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